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MINOR OPERATING MOTOR VEHICLE HELD TO SAME
STANDARD OF CARE AS ADULT WHEN CHARGED
WITH PRIMARY COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE
Carano v. Cardina
115 Ohio App. 30, 184 N.E.2d 430 (1961)
Plaintiff brought an action in the court of common pleas seeking re-
covery of damages for personal injuries suffered as the result of being struck
by an automobile driven by defendant who was a minor, seventeen years of
age. A general verdict for defendant was returned upon which judgment was
entered. Plaintiff appealed the verdict on questions of law, presenting two
assignments of error, one of which was the instruction in the general charge
pertaining to the standard of care required of the minor defendant.' The
court had charged the jury that the minor defendant was not to be held to
the same standard of care as an adult, declaring that a minor seventeen years
of age was to be held to a degree of care that ordinary, careful automobile
drivers of like age and of similar experience, education and ability (mental
and physical) are accustomed to use in the same or similar circumstances. 2
Appellant contended that a seventeen-year-old minor should be held to the
same degree of care as an adult when the minor is operating a motor vehicle.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that in the operation of motor vehicles
upon the highways of Ohio, a minor is to be held to the same standard of
care as an adult.
The standard of care required of an adult 3 has long been that "which
1 The other assignment of error concerned negligence of the plaintiff and is not
relevant to the subject of this note.
2 Carano v. Cardina, 115 Ohio App. 30, 184 N.E.2d 430 (1961). The charge regarding
standard of care was:
... [T]hat degree of care that ordinary, careful and cautious automobile
drivers of the age of 17 years who are possessed with like experience, education,
ability, mental and physical capabilities as the defendant, are accustomed to
use under like or similar circumstances. In other words, a young man of 17
years of age is not chargeable with the same standard of care as is an adult.
To determine his standard of care you will consider the defendant's age, his
education, his experience with automobiles, his training and knowledge concern-
ing traffic rules, and his mental and physical capabilities, all as of the time of
the collision. And then after determining this standard or degree of care that such
young men would or should exercise under the same or similar circumstances,
you will determine whether by the degree of proof charged the defendant met
that standard or fell below it. If he met the standard and exercised that degree
of care reasonably to be expected of him under the existing circumstances, then
you will say he is not guilty of negligence in this respect. But, if you find by
the degree of proof charged that he fell below the standard of care, then you
will say he was negligent.
3 Prosser, Torts § 31 (2d ed. 1955): "The standard required of an individual is that
of the supposed conduct, under similar circumstances, of a hypothetical person, the
reasonable man of ordinary prudence who represents a community ideal of reasonable
behavior."
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requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence
would observe.' 4 Ohio has accepted this standard of care as a requirement
of its adults---that is, an objective standard.
Minors 6 have not been required to meet this objective standard.7 The
leading case of Charbonneau v. MacRury8 held that the law must be indul-
gent in deciding the quality of a minor's conduct and that the adult test of
the reasonable man cannot be applied without regard for the minor's age and
experience. The standard usually applied to minors is essentially a subjective
standard of care.
In the majority of situations, Ohio has followed the Charbonneau v.
MacRury view as to the standard of care required of minors.9 Ohio requires
a child to exercise the degree of care which would be exercised by other
children of the same age, intelligence and experience acting under the same or
similar circumstances.' 0 Heretofore, no distinction has been made in the
standard required of a minor when he is engaged in adult rather than chil-
dren's activities.
The instant case announces a new standard of care for minor operators
of motor vehicles who are charged with actionable negligence: it is the same
standard of ordinary care as is required of a reasonably prudent adult.
4 Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing (N.C.) 467, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
5 Dennison Coal and Supply Co. v. Bartelheim, 122 Ohio St. 374, 378, 171 N.E.
835, 836 (1930): "Now the duty . . .was to exercise the ordinary and reasonable care
that an ordinary, reasonable and prudent man placed under the same or similar cir-
cumstances would have exercised .. "
6 27 Am. Jur. Infants § 2 (1940) defines infant as "any person who has not
reached the age, usually twenty-one years, at which the law recognizes a general con-
tracting ability." The meaning is usually expressed by the word minor.
7 Restatement, Torts § 283 (1934): "Unless the actor is a child or an insane per-
son, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that
of a reasonable man under like circumstances."
Comment e: Children. "The standard of conduct required of children is that which
it is reasonable to expect of children of like age, intelligence and experience."
But see Restatement (Second), Torts § 283A, comment c (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959):
Child engaging in adult activity. "An exception to the rule stated in this section may
arise when the child engages in an activity which is normally undertaken only by adults,
and for which adult qualifications are required ..
8 84 N.H. 501, 153 Atl. 457 (1931).
9 Cleveland Rolling Mill Co. v. Corrigan, 46 Ohio St. 283, 20 N.E. 466 (1889).
Ordinary care for infants "is that degree of care which children of the same age, of
ordinary care and prudence, are accustomed to exercise under similar circumstances."
Accord, Vega v. Evans, 128 Ohio St. 535, 191 N.E. 757 (1934); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L.
Ry. Co. v. Grambo, 103 Ohio St. 471, 134 N.E. 648 (1921).
10 28 Ohio Jur. 2d Infants § 39 (1958):
[ .. Iln the case of negligence, there is authority to the effect that a minor is
not to be held to the standard of care of an adult without regard to his nonage
and want of experience. It has been stated that a child is required to exercise only
that degree of care which the great mass of children of the same age exercise under
the same circumstances, taking into account'the experience, capacity, and under-
standing of the child.
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The MacRury case also held that the same subjective standard of care
applied to minors whether they were charged with contributory or primary
negligence. The court said that to require a minor to exercise a higher degree
of care for the protection of others than he is required to exercise to protect
himself would be an unreasonable distinction." Moreover, the standard was
applied without regard to the type of activity in which the child was engaged.
However, where motor vehicles are involved, the Ohio court has followed
the lead of the Minnesota Supreme Court which held in Dellwo v. Pearson
12
that in the operation of an automobile, airplane or powerboat, a minor is to
be held to the same standard of care as an adult. The Minnesota court held
that when children are engaged in children's activities it can be anticipated
that they will act as children, and anyone observing this activity has fair
warning of what manner of behavior to expect. A person does not have this
same warning when minors engage in the adult activity of operating a motor
vehicle. Usually it cannot be determined whether the operator is a minor or
an adult. The court reasoned that even when warned of the operator's
minority, one "usually cannot protect himself against youthful impru-
dence."' 31 The need for the requirement of an adult standard of care for all
who engage in an adult activity is apparent.14
The departure from the subjective standard of care for minors operating
motor vehicles charged with primary negligence has become necessary. The
death toll on our highways due to carelessly operated vehicles is tragically
high.' G Much of this carnage is caused by minors. 16 The loss resulting from
11 Charbonneau v. MacRury, supra note 8, at 508, 153 AtI. at 461:
If the law requires a minor for his own protection "to exercise the degree of
care and caution of which he is capable," or which he "would naturally be ex-
pected to use," to use "the reason he did possess," to conduct himself "free from
fault," to do what one of his age, experience, opportunity and capacity would
have done, it is plain that to exact of him a higher standard of care for the pro-
tection of others would be to require him to exceed his capabilities .... The
law makes no such unreasonable demand.
12 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961).
13 Id. at 45S, 107 N.W.2d at 863.
14 It has been previously held in Ohio, in Karr v. MacNeil, 92 Ohio App. 458, 110
N.E.2d 714 (1952), that a nineteen-year-old minor had the same obligation as an adult
in observing the statutory requirements in operating a motor vehicle on the public
highways, "and a violation thereof by such minor constitutes negligence as a matter
of law; and, if such negligence proximately causes injury to another, the minor may
properly be held to respond in damages for the tort." The Ohio court felt that the instant
holding would bring the standard of care for minors charged with primary common-
law negligence while operating a motor vehicle in line with the rule announced in Karr
v. McNeil.
15 In 1961, actions of drivers resulted in 30,800 deaths; in 1960, the toll stood at
30,400 deaths. "Cowboys and Engines," The Travelers 1962 Book of Street and Highway
Accident Data, published by The Travelers Insurance Company, p. 4.
16 In 1961, 273% of drivers involved in fatal accidents were 24 years of age or
under; 4.7% were under 18 years of age. About 15% of all licensed drivers are 24
years of age or under. This age group is involved in approximately "twice as many
fatal accidents as its numbers warrant." Id. at S.
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the careless operation of a motor vehicle is as great whether the negligent
operator is a minor or an adult. In the motor vehicle cases, there has been a
tendency to apply an objective standard of care to minor operators. 17 The
application of the objective standard in primary negligence charges against
minor operators enables the loss caused thereby to be compensated for and
distributed through the use of insurance, whereas the subjective test often
results in uncompensated losses.
The subjective standard has been primarily voiced in cases dealing with
minors charged with contributory negligence.' 8 The late Harry Shulman,
Dean of the Yale Law School, made the following cogent argument in support
of a dual standard of care applicable for children:
The standard of conduct to which an infant is to be held when his
own liability is in question may properly be quite different from
that to which he is to be held when he seeks to recover from an
admittedly negligent defendant. It is apparent that different con-
siderations may be involved in these several types of cases. There
is a strong policy in favor of protecting children from losses attribut-
able to their immaturity. It would be quite plausible, therefore,
for a court to be more lenient toward children whose injuries are
attributable, not only to their immaturity, but also to conceded
tortious conduct on the part of the defendant, than toward children
who are the sole responsible cause of injury to others. 19
The subjective test protects children from uncompensated loss caused in part
by their immaturity and in part by the tortious conduct of another. A differ-
ent standard should be applied when the child's actionable negligence has
caused his liability to be put in issue. Here the loss due to the child's imma-
turity is cast upon another person. The policy argument for the use of the
subjective standard is weak in this instance.
17 Shulman, "The Standard of Care Required of Children," 37 Yale L.J. 618 (1928):
There are very few cases in which the problem is raised in an issue of direct
negligence for which the infant is sought to be held liable. Most of the cases dis-
cussing the problem are concerned with the child's alleged contributory negligence,
or assumption of risk or some other disabling contributory fault. In many
cases where the child's conduct is considered, the only issue relates to the negli-
gence of the defendant, and the infant's conduct is important only in determin-
ing whether or not the defendant discharged his duty of reasonable care under
the circumstances.
Is Harper & James, The Law of Torts § 16.8 (1956):
The few appellate courts that have faced the problem have also been divided,
though there is reason to believe that trial courts are generally applying an ob-
jective adult standard in motor vehicle cases.... [Bly and large children themselves
cannot and do not pay for the injuries they cause. . . . [TIhey constitute one
of the most dangerous classes in society so far as causing motor accidents goes.
It was our conclusion that courts should and probably will (for the most part)
driving a car) to the standard of the reasonably prudent adult.
hold the child defendant who is engaging in dangerous adult activities (such as
19 Shulman, supra note 16, at 619.
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The court in the instant case has changed the Ohio rule in regard to the
standard of care required of minor operators of motor vehicles upon the
public highways who are charged with primary common-law negligence. It is
submitted that the application of the objective standard to minor operators
of motor vehicles charged with primary common-law negligence is proper.
However, it is felt that this standard should be limited to actionable primary
negligence. The retention of the subjective test in cases of contributory
negligence will serve to protect the minor from losses caused in part by his
immaturity, while the use of the objective standard for charges of actionable
primary negligence against minor motor vehicle operators will serve to pro-
tect injured persons from losses caused solely by the minor's negligence.
The proposed limitation will result in a dual standard of care for minors.
There are no real difficulties inherent in such a dual standard. Both stand-
ards can be applied with results which will be of greater benefit to society.
